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THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW 
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Bill 0. Heder* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One day in the fall of 1994, I turned around and found that 
my twin boys were suddenly old enough to attend elementary 
school. Central Elementary, the closest school (and thus the 
school of choice) was located just four blocks down our street 
and was staffed mostly with people I knew who were graduates 
of the local university. In anticipation of our inevitable P.T.A. 
membership, my wife and I discussed for the first time the type 
of school environment our children were likely to encounter, 
and how we felt about it. 
Our discussion was perhaps typical of young parents in 
small-town America. We talked briefly of the quality of the 
instruction and facilities. With a cynical acceptance of the fact 
that grade-schoolers were bound to wear out pants, shoes, and 
the occasional elbow or collar bone, student health and safety 
were almost non-issues to us. Obviously, we were not aware 
that elsewhere, in school districts throughout the United 
States, schools were initiating canine drug search policies in 
classrooms and halls, and still others were executing random 
drug testing among high school athletes. 
It has been said that we live in a country made of communi-
ties where our neighborhood school may have been built in the 
Kodachrome years of World War II, or where the shiny new 
school is funded by our increased property taxes. We live close 
enough to hear the roaring crowds at the local high school foot-
ball games from our back porch. We wear hats and jackets pro-
moting the band or baseball programs. 
It seems counter-intuitive, if not un-American, to react to 
increased regulation in our local school with home schooling. 
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1998. Member, Utah Bar. Associate, Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, P.C., Provo, Utah. 
71 
72 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1999 
Similarly, there is something un-neighborly about secreting our 
children away to private school because of book bag checks at 
the local public school. Having said so, it is hardly deniable that 
the increased regulation of public schools impinges on a com-
mon nerve of parents nation-wide; it seems to constitute a sur-
render of part ofwho we are and where we came from. 
It is likely that the perceived loss arises from a cumulative 
estimation of what public education should be and what chil-
dren need and deserve. We have definite ideas about what 
growing up in America should be. Perhaps it is the threat to 
these ideas that most begs the question, "What do we expect 
from public education, and at what price?" Analysis of the Su-
preme Court's decisions affecting public schools reveals a spe-
cial sensitivity to the unique issues of children, regardless of 
their age. However, that sensitivity is at best only a partial 
explanation for the decisions that have come from that Court. 
A continued search necessarily embraces an innumerable 
set of factors which directly and indirectly propel the condition 
and the social contribution of public education in the United 
States. This paper traces just one critical influence in that 
equation: the law of search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment. 1 This narrow focus stems from the idea that in the 
context of public education's goals and limitations, the issue of 
search and seizure among students may indicate a crippling of 
public education's posture, and doubts about its future contri-
bution to society. 
In addressing the legal issue of search and seizure in public 
schools, this article provides an accurate perspective from 
which the reader may better analyze the current state of the 
applicable law. Substantial discussion will be devoted to provid-
ing a historical context for the pivotal court decisions related to 
this issue. From the perspective gained in this analysis, a set of 
elemental arguments will be identified consisting of principles 
recognized and then applied by the Supreme Court in decisions 
throughout the twentieth century. 
These arguments will be presented and analyzed under the 
recognition that the same principles will determine the future 
course of search and seizure in public schools. Court holdings 
1. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
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will be scrutinized as indicia of our changing societal view of 
children's individual liberties. Administrative reactions to those 
decisions will be considered as predicates to future policy. In 
the end, it is hoped that the reader will feel not only primed but 
compelled to ask and answer the seminal question: "What do I 
expect from public education, and at what price?" 
II. PRIVACY UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
As is often the case with beginnings weighted in social con-
sequence, there are a multitude of factors which led to a judicial 
recognition of students' right to privacy in public school. The 
constitutional basis for our law dictates that recognition begins 
with several significant interpretations of the protective lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment. The application of that lan-
guage by case law to various areas of our society makes up the 
history of students' rights to privacy under search and seizure 
law. 
A. THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION 
To state that the Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreason-
able searches and seizures" by the government is the truth, but 
hardly the whole truth. 2 For rather than removing uncertainty 
about privacy rights in citizens, that language begs two imme-
diate questions of interpretation: what is meant by "govern-
ment" and what is meant by "unreasonable?" In turn, the an-
swers to those queries lead to more questioning, and the analy-
sis of a constitutional search has begun. 
The first question of whether a given search is a govern-
ment act is a revealing query. With this first question comes a 
realization that there are more searches which do not trigger 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny than those which do. The everyday 
example of a father's search of his teenager's room is much 
more common than police searches, and yet the father's search 
does not qualify for Fourth Amendment protections. However, 
in order for police officers or agents to search the boy's room, 
2. U.S. CONST. amend IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized." 
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they must produce a valid and detailed warrant, supported by 
affidavits showing probable cause. Such a process necessarily 
and intentionally limits the frequency and scope of government 
searches. 
In critiquing search and seizure issues as applied to the 
public school environment, one must focus on the school official 
as a government actor (rather than the police), and must ana-
lyze what safeguards are in place to protect individual privacy 
from his or her search. Focusing on a discrete set of contribut-
ing cases is necessary because the majority of decisions dealing 
with issues in public schools, other than the Fourth Amend-
ment, can be set aside as either distractive to the issue of stu-
dent privacy or redundant to lesser points.3 
3. A sampling of the broad range of decisions relating to student rights in 
public schools: In Foley v. Benedict, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932), the court held that 
students were not entitled to a hearing for academic dismissal. That decision would 
later be supported by the Supreme Court in Regents of University of Michigan v. 
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985), where the Court upheld the dichotomy between academic 
and disciplinary dismissal as to due process protections. The Seventh Circuit, Scoville 
v. Board of Education. of Joliet Twp., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), held that a student 
underground paper called "Grass High" could not be censored by administration. A 
much earlier case, Minersville School District. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) 
(overruled by West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), 
had supported school administrative restrictions upon students' rights to free speech 
arguably not nearly as "inappropriate" as the Scoville example. Although the school 
administration, had labeled the student paper "inappropriate" and "indecent", the 
expelled members of the student staff won the lawsuit. Going the other direction, the 
Sixth Circuit sided with the school officials in Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6'h Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971). There the school had a long-standing rule 
against the wearing of buttons, badges, scarves and other means whereby the wearers 
identifY themselves as supporters of a cause or bearing messages unrelated to their 
education. The court found the button wearing rule appropriate in light of disruptive 
conduct possibilities. In Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995 (D. Maine 1982), students 
were expelled for the possession of marijuana and the expulsion was upheld by the 
court which decided that students had no right to something equivalent to a Miranda 
warning. After the Supreme Court's adamant defense of individual liberties in West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), a subsequent 
decision, Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1969), found the Court rejecting a 
statutory prohibition against teaching Darwinism in schools but then affirming, in the 
same opinion, the necessity of comprehensive authority in State and school authorities 
to prescribe and control conduct and curriculum in schools. The Court emphatically 
upheld the protection of constitutional freedoms in schools in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479 (1960), but then issued a decision eighteen years later in Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (administrative censorship of school 
newspaper was permissible), that outraged many in the literary world as a complete 
demolition of free expression in public schools. See infra, note 53. 
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The fact is, the Supreme Court did not really address stu-
dent privacy rights in public schools until 1985, after a long 
series of contradictory decisions from lower courts.4 These lower 
court decisions will be summarized merely to indicate the vari-
ous court approaches to the issue of student Fourth Amend-
ment rights. Their lack of cohesion serves best as an indication 
of the need for finality from the Supreme Court, which came 
with the ruling in New Jersey v. T.L.O., in 1985.5 
A small group of decisions, which will be addressed in 
greater length, consists of those select cases in which elemental 
issues of constitutional protections were addressed and defined 
by the Court in such a way as to provide a basis for the T.L. 0. 
decision and its progeny.6 Unlike the first scattered group, the 
decisions from this smaller set were not isolated to the area of 
student's rights. They were cases from various gristmills of law 
in our society: criminal, civil, residential and industrial. The 
decisions in those cases refined search and seizure principles, 
forming precedential steps by which the Court would ultimately 
bring the Fourth Amendment to the doors of public school. 
These cases and the rules flowing from them were employed 
to create the "special needs" exception-the latest and most 
broad exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.7 This line of cases, tracing the development of 
4. See infra notes 42 and 43. 
5. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
6. Id. at 325 (1985). Significant decisions applied: Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206 (1960) (applying the Fourth Amendment protections to the States via the 
Fourteenth Amendment); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624 (1943) (necessity of upholding constitutional protections if we are to teach 
youth the validity of the constitution); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (defining governmental actions as activities by 
State agents and agencies); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) 
(balancing test between governmental need and the weight of intrusion); Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (hasty and effective action needed to maintain discipline 
necessary in school setting); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967) (even a limited search 
of a person is an intrusion); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) 
("probable cause is not an 'irreducible' requirement of a valid search"). 
7. After its introduction into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the special 
needs exception expanded. Examples of special needs searches today are numerous. 
They include searches of prisoners, parolees, and probationers, as well as border 
searches, immigration stops and searches, airport security checks, administrative and 
regulatory searches, and military searches. The most recent example is found in the 
practice of drug testing employees in certain fields. See Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
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exceptions to the warrant requirement, is of such independent 
significance that it necessitates separate discussion. 
B. DEFINING A GOVERNMENT SEARCH 
Considering the list of societal players from parents to nosy 
neighbors and their pets, there will likely always be unwanted 
searches taking place for which there is no Fourth Amendment 
protection. It is not these intrusions which we address or which 
the courts consider under the Constitution. The only searches of 
constitutional consequence are those executed with the aid, 
assistance, or approval of government actors or officials. 8 The 
Supreme Court gave some direction on what actors and activi-
ties constituted a government action in 1960 with Elkins v. 
United States. 9 But it was seven years later in Katz v. United 
States that the Court took an opportunity to measure what 
government actions were acceptable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.10 
1. The Katz Case 
In 1967, Charles Katz was convicted in the District Court 
for the Southern District of California under an eight-count 
indictment charging him with transmitting wagering informa-
tion by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in 
violation of a federal statute. 11 At trial the Government was 
permitted, over the defendant's objection, to introduce evidence 
of his end of the telephone conversations. These conversations 
were overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic 
listening and recording device to the outside of the public tele-
phone booth from which he had placed his calls. In affirming 
his conviction, the court of appeals rejected the contention that 
the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth 
8. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960). 
9. !d. 
10. 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
11. 18 U.S.C. §1084 provided in pertinent part: "(a) Whoever being engaged in 
the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for 
the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information 
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the 
transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money 
or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of 
bets or wagers, shall be fined ... or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 
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Amendment because there was no physical entrance into the 
area occupied by the defendant. 
The issues presented on appeal to the Supreme Court were: 
1) whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally pro-
tected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic 
listening device is in violation of the right to privacy of the user 
of the booth, and 2) whether physical penetration of a constitu-
tionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure 
can be said to violate the Fourth Amendment. 12 
A Analysis 
In the first words of the opinion, the Court quickly ended 
the argument over whether a telephone booth was a "constitu-
tionally protected area" by stating that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people and their interests, not places. 13 Therefore, the 
telephone booth was not at issue. Perhaps more significant, the 
Court concluded that what a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home, would not be the subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection. 14 The counter assertion of that 
statement is that what a person does not hold out to the public, 
regardless ofwhere he keeps it private, carries an interest pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment right to privacy. The Court 
dismissed a Government claim that lack of physical trespass 
was a threshold requirement of a search or seizure, then moved 
to the issue ofwarrants and probable cause for the search. 15 
The officers in Katz had exercised great caution and re-
straint in an effort to insure that the search was not held un-
reasonable. They had taken care that only Mr. Katz's conversa-
tions were recorded or listened to. They had only installed the 
bug after having probable cause to believe that betting was 
going on. But the Court was not swayed by preventative cau-
tion. In spite of the fact that the government had shown that a 
magistrate would have granted them a warrant for their search 
if they had asked, the Court was not willing to allow the gov-
ernment agents themselves to exercise that class of discretion. 16 
12. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-50. 
13. See id. at 351. 
14. See id. 
15. See id. at 354, 355. 
16. See id. at 356, 357. 
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Ultimately, the Court held that when lacking a prior war-
rant supported by sworn affidavit proving probable cause, a 
search was "per se unreasonable," and the evidence gathered 
therefrom could not be used against Mr. Katz. 17 It should be 
noted that in so finding, the Court recognized several different 
circumstances in which exceptions to the warrant requirement 
were already in place.18 These circumstances included the 
search incident to a lawful arrest, 19 the exigency exception of 
hot pursuit of a suspect,20 and a search with a suspect's con-
sent.21 
As a result of Katz, the formal test for a legal search rested 
on basic text-driven requirements from the plain language of 
the Fourth Amendment: 1) was the government involved, 2) did 
the suspect subjectively expect privacy, 3) was that expectation 
accepted by society as reasonable, and 4) did the officer have a 
warrant supported by probable cause and issued by a neutral 
magistrate? The significance of these stated criteria in the con-
text of public school search and seizure is that by the time the 
Court finally addressed the Fourth Amendment in a public 
school setting, these requirements had been substantially re-
moved by a series of cases creating exceptions to the Katz hold-
ing.22 
C. THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT ACTORS AND ACTIONS 
Prior to the Katz decision, the Court had already identified 
the first requirement-government action-as any search con-
ducted under the direction or request or permission of the gov-
ernment or its agent. 23 In at least one otherwise unrelated con-
sideration of Fourteenth Amendment requirements in 1943, the 
17. !d. at 358, 359. 
18. See id. at 357. 
19. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
20. See Warden Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
21. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946). 
22. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) ("Just as we have in 
other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when 'the burden of obtaining 
a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search,' [Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)], we hold today that school officials 
need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority"). 
23. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960). 
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Court had defined government actors or agents to include 
school boards and school administrators. 24 Certainly then, in 
the context of public school privacy issues, the relationship of 
the searcher to the individual or property being searched be-
comes critical to the analysis. The father searching his child's 
bedroom is not a government actor. However, if he happens to 
be a school administrator and searches his child's school locker, 
under the decisions leading to T.L. 0., he will have triggered 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny by his actions. 
Part of the principle debate as to administrative duties in 
public schools is centered on the principle of in loco parentis 
(acting in the parents' place). This idea will be discussed in 
greater length under the T.L. 0. decision, however it should be 
noted for the sake of perspective, if nothing else, that some of 
the pressure applied in T.L. 0. was to persuade the Supreme 
Court to view the searches differently in light of the school set-
ting. This pressure came from the idea that a school adminis-
trator acts in the place of parents, arguably changing that criti-
cal relational element of the search analysis. 
D. EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 
For the sake of preliminary discussion, school search and 
seizure can be assumed to be a state action. The language of the 
Fourth Amendment provides an order of elimination by which 
the remaining issues are to be addressed. 25 Once having deter-
mined, for example, that the search was a state action, the next 
issue, again outlined in Katz, becomes whether there was a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the item being searched. If 
not, the scrutiny ends. If there was such an expectation, a final 
test is required: whether that person's expectation is reasonable. 
Again, a negative finding ends the scrutiny. A positive re-
sponse, by strict constitutional definition, makes the search 
unreasonable. 
The application of this test is clearer in the example of the 
father and teenager. In that scenario, the father's search of the 
room failed the threshold requirement of Fourth Amendment 
analysis in that the was not a state actor or agent in relation to 
24. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
25. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurrence). 
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the teenager. However, if we were to assume the possibility 
that the father was a school administrator and had searched 
the teenager's school locker, under the early case which defined 
school authorities as State actors, the first criteria is met and 
the second and third factors come into play. 26 At home, though 
the child might have an expectation of privacy from parents, 
society is not willing to recognize that expectation as reason-
able. 
It is not by coincidence that this issue of "reasonable expec-
tation" becomes a core consideration in any application of 
search and seizure law in public schools. Does the student have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her locker? This 
kind of question has become integral to court determinations of 
the nature of school administrative actions. This type of ques-
tion is reformed and revised and reapplied for each school and 
each student in the United States. Each new iteration changes 
the expression and application of search and seizure law in 
public schools. If one student cannot reasonably expect privacy 
for his public school locker, then can another student expect to 
maintain the privacy of her book bag contents? If a book bag, 
then what about a purse? If a purse, what about a coat pocket? 
If a coat pocket, then what about a pant pocket? If a pant 
pocket, then what about underclothing? If underclothing, then 
what about body fluids? 
Such a direct line drawn from lockers to test tubes acceler-
ates the discussion, but can also be distracting. The issue of 
student privacy does not generate answers by a tangential mea-
sure of a search's proximity to an individual student's bare 
skin. With each case, different circumstances (each paralleling 
the Fourth Amendment analysis in importance) must be consid-
ered. There is no denying that individual circumstances and 
factors tend to muddy constitutional water and make the anal-
ysis-not to mention the application-of the Fourth Amendment 
much less definitive. For instance, under the Katz test, a locker 
search may be appropriate if supported by a warrant based on 
probable cause. However, the same search may not have been 
appropriate for a row of lockers. Such a search would be too 
generalized and risks intrusion upon students outside the circle 
26. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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of suspicion. And yet, as the analysis continues, such a search 
(suspicionless) for drugs becomes permissible. 
Thus, the Fourth Amendment merely constitutes a point of 
entry for search and seizure analysis in public schools, and does 
not supply a solid formula for every circumstance. Each case 
requires the court (or lesser actors) to determine what consti-
tutes a reasonable expectation under the circumstances. It is 
the demonstrated difficulty and inconsistency of that determi-
nation that so complicates the definition of privacy in public 
schools. 
E. ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE ''REASONABLE" EXPECTATIONS OF 
PRIVACY 
Due in part to the fact that the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment merely includes a prohibition against "unreason-
able" searches and seizures by the government, the Supreme 
Court has not supplied a clear definition of what constitutes a 
reasonable search or seizure. The test for subjective and socially 
acceptable privacy expectations places immense discretionary 
and interpretive burdens upon the courts. How, for instance, is 
a court to know with certainty what society deems a reasonable 
expectation? Similarly, how is the court to accurately interpret 
each new set of social and personal circumstances attending 
each new search? Moreover, the answer might be easier to live 
with than its ramifications. The fact that a given search vio-
lates a drug dealer's reasonable expectation of privacy will not 
assuage the neighborhood fury over a crack house left open for 
business. Thus, the definition of what is reasonable grows in 
importance as well as perplexity. 
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 27 the Court 
stated that reasonableness "depends upon all of the circum-
stances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the 
search or seizure itself."28 From this open-ended definition came 
the development of the first of several balancing tests regarding 
search and seizure. Unable to find a bright line definition for an 
enigmatic word like "reasonableness," this balancing test at-
tempts to ferret out the greater good by sorting all the circum-
27. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985). 
28. 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). 
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stances surrounding a given search onto the side of either gov-
ernmental interest or intrusion.29 
In reality, all this dividing and weighing only creates more 
questions. After all, the enhanced order of consideration entails 
the following: 1) was the search conducted by a government 
actor or agent, 2) if so, did the party being searched have a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the item searched, 3) if so, 
is that expectation one which society is willing to accept as 
reasonable, and 4) if so, did the governmental need outweigh 
the intrusion upon a citizen's privacy? But how is the court to 
decide the gravity of the governmental interest or predict the 
ramifications of a single intrusion upon privacy? 
The test, like others measuring concepts of social con-
science, cries out for a numerical weight or register which offers 
some exactness. But numerical formulas are not effectively 
applied to issues of human discretion, and a court, having found 
no common denominator for individual rights, is perhaps the 
least likely institution to attempt such an application. 30 In-
stead, it generally will choose to err on the side of the individ-
ual rights, as it did in the case of privacy, creating a presump-
tion that any intrusion is unreasonable where the government 
or its agent has not proven it to be necessary by sworn affidavit. 
In light of that presumption, the government actor is re-
quired to obtain a valid search warrant by demonstrating prob-
able cause to a neutral magistrate prior to conducting the 
search. The purpose of this exercise, as explained by the Su-
preme Court in Aguilar u. Texas, is to insure that the rights of 
the individual are not lost or forgotten in the harried atmo-
sphere of law enforcement.31 
29. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543 (1976). 
30. The appreciable nature of individual human rights seems such that our 
judicial system has never been willing, as a whole, to assign numbers to the 
evaluation of constitutional rights, human pain and suffering, life or death. The mere 
contemplation devalues intangible interests. Thus, flat numerical systems for 
measuring such damages are strongly discouraged. Tort money damage claims 
represent the closest relation to such a measurement, but are still a crude mechanism 
for compensating victims for damage to something considered inalienable. They are 
only "accurate" when based upon some contractual measure such as insurance terms 
or anticipated financial costs or losses. 
31. 378 u.s. 108 (1964). 
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In practical effect, the neutral magistrate becomes a gate-
keeper, charged with issuing warrants only where there is 
probable cause to believe that the search will reveal evidence of 
the commission or contemplation of a crime. Sworn affidavits 
showing that probability and an explanation of why a warrant 
is necessary to further important police interests, help create a 
balancing mechanism to measure the level of intrusion against 
the governmental interest. A secondary but wholly appreciable 
contribution of this requirement is to minimize for law enforce-
ment personnel the opportunity to abuse discretion imposed 
upon them by the Supreme Court's circumstantial definition of 
a "reasonable" search. 32 
F. EXIGENCY EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE 
The development of a presumption of unreasonableness 
without a warrant gave rise to a series of cases and decisions in 
which efforts to protect individual rights by correctly balancing 
government interests and privacy considerations failed to sat-
isfy the practical needs of administration.33 In final effect, the 
balancing test of a reasonable burden relative to government 
interest need only be applied in cases where the warrant and 
probable cause requirements have been met, and yet a social ill 
persists or perhaps thrives. In those cases (a number of which 
were presented to the courts immediately on the heels of Katz), 
strict adherence to the Katz holding simply meant that criminal 
activity was benefitted more than law enforcement-to a point 
that society would not tolerate. 
One reality of document-driven law is that a lack of discre-
tion in the field makes for very immobile policing. It is merely a 
reiteration of the age-old conflict between the risks of discretion 
and the costs of inefficiency. From the criminal perspective, an 
immense, text-heavy law in the middle of the road promotes 
detours. The law of search and seizure after Katz was more 
dependant upon its own wording and predictably less mobile for 
lack of discretionary application; it was thus more subject to 
avoidance. 34 
32. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967). 
33. See infra notes 38-40. 
34. !d. 
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Addressing this conflict between constitutional protection 
and undesirable results, the courts carved out exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment formula requirements. 35 For example, 
warrantless searches were upheld when exigent circumstances 
required an immediate search to prevent the destruction or loss 
of evidence of a crime. 36 This represented a reversal of fortunes 
for some. The individual interests that had been protected by 
the warrant and probable cause requirements could now be 
presumed socially unacceptable if the privacy was too likely to 
serve a criminal purpose. This exigency exception cut off the 
analysis at the point of reasonable expectations of privacy. A 
suspect who ran from the police was deemed to hold no reason-
able expectation of privacy even in his own home. 37 The ques-
tion was never asked whether or not the search had been sup-
ported by a valid warrant. 
Technically, the test for a valid search did not change; 
rather, the quality of expectation in privacy changed. Again, the 
analogy of a parent's search of the teenager's bedroom leaps to 
mind, expanded somewhat by exception to a sense of social 
governance. In a paternalistic posture, society says to the mis-
creant child through the court, "I will respect your rights until 
you demonstrate to me that you cannot be trusted, then don't 
expect to be cut any slack!" 
In recent years, warrantless searches have been upheld by 
the Supreme Court for officers in hot pursuit of a suspect,:la in 
police stop-and-frisk searches and in border searches.:l9 Still 
more exceptions have been carved out under a premise that 
failure of an individual to exhibit a certain level of interest in 
privacy (as demonstrated by a failure to sufficiently secure or 
hide items) displaces the warranty requirement. 40 
35. See Myron Schreck, The Fourth Amendment in Public Schools: Issues f'or the 
1990s and Beyond, 25 URB. LAW. 117, 118-19 (1993). 
36. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973). 
37. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
38. See id. at 298. 
39. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 
(1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925). 
40. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 
386 (1985); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798 (1982); United States v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544 ( 1980); United States v. 
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G. ADMINISTRATIVE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE 
The creation of so many exigency exceptions to the strict 
warrant and probable cause requirements of Katz resulted in 
an increased use by the courts of the balancing test to deter-
mine the reasonableness of searches in troublesome industries 
or public services. Recall for a moment the balancing test al-
ready discussed in terms of the weight of intrusion upon pri-
vacy compared to the governmental need. 41 That balance test 
was applied, in part, by defining "reasonable" according to the 
presence or lack of a valid warrant. 42 In light of so many exi-
gency exceptions to the warrant requirement, reasonableness 
based on the warrant presence or lack thereof was ineffective. 
The troublesome cases were becoming less and less exceptional. 
Thus, the courts devised a new class of searches, such as ad-
ministrative searches, which, because of their unique settings, 
carried a presumption of reasonableness without warrants. 43 
2. The Camara Decision 
Soon the old bones of the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements of Katz would be joined by the exigency require-
ment, dismissed in an increasing number of cases with the 
recognition that the administration of specific industries and 
activities required constant, close, and sometimes surprising 
regulation in order to curb conditions threatening to the 
public.44 Although the Supreme Court bantered ideas about for 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); 
Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
41. See Skinner v. Ry Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
42. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); United States v. Katz, 389 U.S 
347, 357 (1967). 
43. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (building 
inspection for housing code violations); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) 
(government employer's searching employee's desks); Michigan Dep't. of State Police 
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints upheld). 
44. In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), the Supreme Court first 
addressed the constitutionality of administrative searches and found that warrantless 
administrative searches could be legal. Though the decision was overruled in less 
than a decade by Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), 
and See u. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the factors presented by the Court as 
grounds for dismissing a warrant requirement would lay the groundwork for future 
court dismissal of a warrant requirement in "special needs" situations. Those theories 
were that the inspection touched at most upon the periphery of the important 
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3. Analysis 
The Supreme Court's decision, while riddled with solid ref-
erences to Fourth Amendment requirements, presented a mixed 
message. On one hand, the Court said that inspections for the 
general public health or welfare for fire code violations required 
a kind of warrant that did not require probable cause to believe 
that a specific person or residence was in violation of the law.48 
On the other hand, the Court insisted that a warrant must be 
issued in order to define the scope and authority of the inspec-
tion.49 The Court then hinted that the warrant could be deemed 
"reasonable" if the legislature statutorily defined the criteria 
and the scope in light of a known public concern. 50 Rather than 
saying that a warrant is always required, the Court admited 
that one is not. Rather than insist that probable cause is always 
required, the Court stated that circumstances meeting a statu-
tory permission of inspection would satisfy the probable cause 
requirement. 
Perhaps most significant for the development of further 
exceptions that followed the Camara decision, the Court had 
stated that exceptions for certain industries and activities do 
exist, and that the elements of a warrant and probable cause 
can be more or less critical depending upon the situation. 51 
Furthermore, the Court set out a reasonableness standard for 
administrative searches that balanced valid public interests 
against private intrusions. 
In the process of rejecting Frank, the Camara Court admit-
ted the fact that the traditional probable cause requirement 
was ill-fitted to the unique circumstances of typical administra-
tive search situations. The Court set out a revised reasonable-
ness standard for these searches that balanced public interests 
against the intrusion upon private interests. Administrative 
searches without warrants were justified without a complete 
showing of probable cause, based on consideration of the follow-
ing factors: 1) the long history of judicial and public acceptance 
of administrative need in the area, 2) the public interest de-
manding that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, 
48. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 523 (1967). 
49. See id. at 532-33. 
50. See id. at 538. 
51. !d. at 539. 
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and 3) the fact that the invasions only involved a limited inva-
sion of privacy.52 This new set of considerations became increas-
ingly significant as the Court approached search and seizure in 
public schools. 
With new-found regulatory freedom, administrative 
searches grew in number and type relatively quickly, forming a 
recognizable appendage to the body of search and seizure law. 
In the same year, 1967, the Supreme Court applied the Camara 
considerations to justify inspections of buildings not used as 
residences. 53 Then, in addition to building inspections, the 
courts across the country would follow the Supreme Court's 
lead and uphold regulatory searches in closely regulated busi-
nesses such as pharmaceutical,54 firearm, 55 nuclear56 and min-
ing industries. 57 
III. BRINGING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO SCHOOL 
Having traced the evolution of Fourth Amendment analysis 
from the hard rules of the Katz decision to the expanding 
classes of exception, we turn now to the line of cases upon 
which the points of the majority argument in New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. were based.58 While the Fourth Amendment cases moved 
toward a recognition of unique standards for reasonableness to 
meet unique circumstances, this next line of cases led the Court 
to a particular setting that demanded another kind of excep-
tion. At most, the convergence of the two lines of cases may 
have been unavoidable. At a minimum, it was fortunate timing. 
When the Supreme Court addressed the issue of privacy for 
students in public school, a line of cases was waiting in the 
wings that said the Court could make exceptions to the warrant 
and probable cause interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Seen from the other side, with the increasing recognition of 
52. In the end, the Court admitted that no "ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which 
the search entails" could adequately resolve the question of administrative searches. 
Id. at 536-37. 
53. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
54. See United States v. Pendergast, 436 F. Supp. 931 (W.D. Pa. 1977). 
55. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
56. See Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (81h Cir. 1988). 
57. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
58. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
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public interests which cried out for a broader exception to the 
Katz rules, the issue of public school privacy came forward to 
create an extremely sympathetic stage for just such an exten-
siOn. 
A. DEFINING A GOVERNMENT ACTOR 
The underlying assumption in the T.L.O. argument was 
that an unreasonable search was prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment, as imposed upon the State and its actors by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 59 This application was first made by 
the Court in Wolf v. Colorado60 in 1949 and then reaffirmed in 
Elkins v. United States in 1960.61 More significantly in the ma-
jority's argument, after Elkins and Wolf became the law on 
government intrusions upon privacy, the Court noted that the 
definition of government action had already been expanded to 
include public school administration in West Virginia State Bd. 
of Ed. v. Barnette. 62 Thus it is with Barnette that the discussion 
of who constitutes a government actor begins. 
4. The Barnette Case 
An early decision by the Supreme Court in 1940, Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis, assumed a general power in the 
States to impose certain cultural routines and requirements 
(such as the flag salute discipline) upon their citizens.63 Accord-
ingly, the West Virginia Legislature amended its statutes to 
require all schools therein to conduct courses of instruction in 
history, civics, and the constitutions of the United States and 
the State of West Virginia. This was for the stated purpose of 
teaching, fostering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and 
spirit of Americanism, among other things. 
In 1942, following that legislation, the West Virginia State 
Board of Education adopted a resolution heavily dependant 
upon language from the Gobitis decision and ordered "that the 
salute to the flag become a 'regular part of the daily program 
59. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960). 
60. 338 u.s. 25 (1949). 
61. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
62. 319 u.s. 624, 637 (1943). 
63. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
90 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1999 
and activities in public schools.' "64 After some debate within the 
school communities, the salute required was a straight-armed 
salute with the child keeping the right hand forward and 
raised, the palm turned upward, and repeating the Pledge of 
Allegiance.65 
Failure to conform to the routine was considered "insubordi-
nation" and was dealt with by expulsion from school. Readmis-
sion was denied until the student complied. In the meantime, 
until the child complied, he or she was considered "unlawfully 
absent," an extended duration ofwhich would allow the state to 
pursue the parents with a misdemeanor charge, a fine and pos-
sible jail term.66 Some students, primarily those of the Jeho-
vah's Witness faith, refused to comply with the routine as a 
matter of religious belief, and were expelled and threatened 
with transfer to juvenile detention facilities. 
5. Analysis 
In Barnette, the Supreme Court reconsidered Gobitis in 
order to decide the extent of religious protection applicable to 
students as imposed upon the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.67 In so doing, the Court reached the following conclusion, 
which was instrumental to later holdings regarding public 
schools: 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, 
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its crea-
tures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of 
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary function, 
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the 
Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizen-
ship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional 
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free 
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important 
principles of our government as mere platitudes.68 
64. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624-25. 
65. See id. at 627. 
66. See id. at 625. 
67. See id. at 627. 
68. ld. at 637. 
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While the overt intent of the decision focused on religious 
freedom under the First Amendment, a significant result was 
the threshold recognition in T.L.O. of the critical balance that 
must be struck between the essential social responsibilities and 
the liabilities of public school administration.69 The recognition 
of this responsibility was then coupled with an argument that 
Fourth Amendment prohibitions formerly applied exclusively to 
police searches should logically be extended to all exercise of 
sovereign authority by virtue of the Court's holding in Camara 
v. Municipal Court in 1967.70 It is this assumption of duty and 
authority that forms a base for actions of search and seizure in 
public schools. 
B. UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC SCHOOL 
As the case law indicates, it is safe to state that search and 
seizure, as a cohesive legal concept, did not exist in public 
schools before the early 1960s and perhaps not to any great 
extent until T.L.O. in 1985.71 Admittedly, this generalization 
hinges upon a broad view of the history of public school and a 
view of a prior day when corporeal punishment and regulation 
did not yield to students claiming rights to privacy. 
While there was a small group of public education cases 
filed and fought prior to 1960, they dealt for the most part with 
quality of education, parents' rights of decision, and the com-
pulsory nature of the rapidly expanding public school system.72 
Judicial appeals in the interest of students' rights under the 
constitution were noticeably absent prior to the 1960s. 
It is fair to assume, then, in regard to disciplinary actions in 
public schools over those early decades, that without the spec-
ter of litigation that drives so much of administrative policy 
today, something like the forced emptying of pockets during a 
bubble gum inspection from the 1950s could not be considered 
under the same hot light of constitutional ramification that 
69. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985). 
70. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
71. 469 u.s. 325 (1985). 
72. Examples of early education cases are Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923), wherein the parental right to instruct a child in German in a private school 
was upheld, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925), in which the parental right to educate a child as one chooses 
was grounded in First and Fourteenth Amendment protection. 
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would later illuminate a search of purse or pocket in a drug-
related search in 1985. Of course there were the occasional 
class-room shake downs of a suspected cheat, and the memora-
ble grimace of a matronly grammar teacher in sharp spectacles. 
There were storied interrogation scenes in the vice principal's 
office (blinds drawn) and then detention hall after school. The 
essential differences between those actions then and now are 
found in the line of cases which defines the roles and responsi-
bilities of public school administrators. 
C. AN INCREASING RECOGNITION OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
Until the late 1940s, none of the Fourteenth Amendment 
due process provisions were applied to the States by the Su-
preme Court. 73 In fact, only the Fourth Amendment prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial were addressed before 
1961.74 Eventually, the protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Eighth Amendments were held to be binding upon State 
legislatures and State courts, but it would still take decades of 
social change and several landmark cases involving students in 
public schools to bring a student with a Fourth Amendment 
claim to the Supreme Court. 75 
73. The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and the exclusionary rule requiring 
that the result of a violation of this prohibition not be used as evidence against the 
defendant, See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Fifth 
Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 
(1969). The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 
U.S. 213 (1967). The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257 (1948). The Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145 (1968). The Sixth Amendment Right to confront witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 
380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). The Sixth Amendment right to 
assistance of counsel in felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and 
in misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment is imposed, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25 (1972). The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
74. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949J. 
75. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). A fourteen-year-old high 
school freshman was accused of smoking in the girls lavatory. When she denied it, 
cigarettes were found in her purse. The search Jed to suspicion of drug use, and when 
continued, revealed marijuana. While there is no question that some students smoked 
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The Fourth Amendment history, leading to the development 
of administrative searches, exigency exceptions, etc. is vital to 
an understanding of New Jersey v. T.L.O. 76 in 1985. However, 
contemporary to the line of cases leading to administrative 
searches and then to the "special needs exception,"77 there was 
a group of cases dealing with constitutional protections in 
schools, which also influenced the Supreme Court's decision in 
T.L. 0. 78 This parallel line of cases includes early decisions such 
as Meyer v. Nebraska. 79 There, the Supreme Court held that 
State laws could not be passed under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections which interfere with the rights of parents to 
have their children learn a foreign language. 
Scattered Decisions 
Not all of the decisions concerning students were as favor-
able as Meyer or Barnette, which followed later. Nor did they 
follow a predictable path toward greater constitutional protec-
tion for students. State and federal courts considering the ques-
tion of Fourth Amendment protections in schools struggled to 
in school bathrooms, even in the1940s and 1950s, T.L.O. was the first case in which 
the accompanying search for cigarettes was contested to the Supreme Court. The 
presence of marijuana, and the attendant charges were undoubtedly critical factors 
in the contest. 
76. !d. 
77. "Special needs exception" was created in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 
(1985). Recognizing the exceptional circumstances, beyond normal need for law 
enforcement, and making the warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable, 
the Court ultimately held that public school officials do not need to obtain a warrant 
in order to search students. 
78. Justice White drafted the opinion, with Justices O'Connor, Blackman, and 
Powell concurring; with partial concurrence and partial dissent by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall. The significant cases of support were, in order of reference. Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (applying the Fourth Amendment protections to 
the States via the Fourteenth Amendment), West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (necessity of upholding constitutional protections if we 
are to teach youth the validity of the Constitution), Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (defining governmental 
actions as activities by State agents and agencies), Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523 (1967) (balancing test between governmental need and the weight of 
intrusion), Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (hasty and effective action needed to 
maintain discipline necessary in school setting), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(even a limited search of a person is an intrusion), Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
413 U.S. 266 (1973) (probable cause is not an "irreducible" requirement of a valid 
search). 
79. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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accommodate the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment 
and the interest of the States in providing a safe environment 
for the educational purposes of public schools. Some courts 
resolved the tension between these interests by weighing one 
greater than the other. In a number of cases, courts held that 
school officials conducting in-school searches of students were 
private parties acting in loco parentis and were, therefore, not 
subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.80 
Other courts held or suggested that the probable cause stan-
dard was applicable at least where the police were involved in 
the search or where it was highly intrusive.81 Many other courts 
seemed to reach a middle ground, where the Fourth Amend-
ment was applied to searches conducted by school authorities, 
but the special needs of the school environment required as-
sessment of the legality of those searches against a standard 
less exacting than the normal probable cause standard. Those 
courts, for the most part, upheld warrantless searches, pro-
vided they were supported by a reasonable suspicion that the 
search would uncover evidence of an infraction of school disci-
plinary rules.82 
The decisions formed a broad range of outcomes. Although 
one could predict an eventual Supreme Court confrontation 
with student privacy,83 it would be difficult to guess which way 
the legal wind would be blowing when it finally happened. The 
early development of search and seizure law in the public 
school resembled the clumsy, head-long surge of the adoles-
cence upon which it so often intruded. There were bold bursts 
and then misgivings in later decisions-admitting the unique-
80. See D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); In re Thomas G., 
90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R.C.M. v. State, 
660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1970). 
81. M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 5, 429 F. 
Supp. 288, (SD Ill. 1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, (N.D. Ill. 1976); State 
v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586, (1975); M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588 (1979). 
82. See Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (CA6 1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 
1462 (CA9 1984); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (CA5 1982); 
Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); In re W., 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 
(1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 
1383 (Fla. App. 1983); People v. Ward, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 
827 (N.M. App. 1975); State v. McKinnon, 558 P.2d 781 (1977); In re L.L., 280 
N.W.2d 343 (Wis. App. 1979). 
83. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
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ness of the public school circumstance. 84 Supreme Court deci-
sions seemed constantly pushed and then reigned in by an ever-
changing social sense of occasion.85 
D. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN STUDENTS 
It is one thing to state that students, being citizens of the 
United States, are entitled to protections under the Constitu-
tion, and even that point has been debated. 86 It has proven a 
completely different battle to define the scope of those rights. 
One of the early decisions addressing what rights a student has 
was Tinker u. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict in 1969.87 
6. The Tinker Decision 
On a December evening in the mid-western winter of 1965, 
at least five Des Moines public school students, including John 
Tinker, fifteen, Christopher Eckhardt, sixteen, and John's little 
sister, Mary Beth Tinker, thirteen, (enrolled in junior high) 
attended a meeting in the Eckhardt home, in which passionate 
views about hostilities in Vietnam were vented and discussed 
between the adults and youth present. As the meeting con-
cluded, the participants determined to make a public showing 
of their support for a truce in Vietnam by wearing black arm-
bands throughout the holiday season. With increased zeal they 
resolved to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. 
In the days following the meeting, some principals from Des 
Moines area schools got wind of the planned activity. On De-
cember 14th, they met, drafted and adopted a policy to deal with 
the demonstrators. Any student wearing an armband to school 
84. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), and the cases 
leading to it; Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 682 F.2d 858 (9'h 
Cir. 1982); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3ru Cir. 1982); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 
F.2d 512 (2"<1 Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). 
85. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The Supreme 
Court almost completely reverses prior arguments in Tinker which promised liberal 
protection to students under the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing the sensitivity of 
school children and the unique responsibility of the school administrator, many were 
shocked by the "step backward" toward censorship in Hazelwood. See, e.g., Richard 
L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual Development, 
79 CAL. L. REV. 1269 (October 1991). 
86. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
87. 393 u.s. 503 (1969). 
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would be asked to remove it. If the student failed to comply, he 
or she would be suspended until they returned without the arm 
band. 
Fully aware of this new policy, on December 16, Mary Beth 
Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore black armbands to their 
schools. John Tinker wore his armband the next day, as did two 
other students who did not become parties to the Tinker suit. 
All refused to remove the armbands when asked, and all were 
suspended as a result. None of the three named students re-
turned to school until after the appointed end of the protest, 
New Year's Eve. Shortly thereafter, a suit was filed against the 
Des Moines Independent School District on behalf of the stu-
dents by their fathers, claiming a violation of the students' 
First Amendment Rights, specifically the right to free speech. 
It is worth noting that by 1969, a century of civil exertion 
had served to raise the public perception of individual liberties 
to the point that even demonstrating students who would have 
been whipped, expelled, and even publicly humiliated in the 
early days of public education could now be granted Supreme 
Court protection. 88 
7. Analysis 
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that students do not 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expres-
sion at the schoolhouse gate.89 In support of that statement, the 
Court relied on Barnette citation noted above. 90 But almost 
immediately after that statement of freedom, the Court cited 
earlier decisions in which it recognized school officials' need to 
maintain order and control conduct.91 The Court recognized the 
critical balance it was being asked to find between a student's 
right to exercise a constitutional right and the school's interest 
in maintaining order and discipline.92 
The Court next initiated a test which would come into play 
in later decisions regarding school administrative actions-the 
reasonableness of an action. In order for a given action by 
88. See id. at 506. 
89. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505. 
90. See supra, note 68. 
91. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505. 
92. See id. at 505-6. 
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school administration to be found reasonable, there must be 
proof that the action was caused by some actual threat of mate-
rial and substantial interference with school functions and pur-
pose.93 A mere desire to avoid discomfort or an "undifferentiated 
fear" of disturbance would not qualify under the Court's test. 94 
The Court went on to say, 
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their 
students. Students in school as well as out of school are "per-
sons" under our Constitution. They are possessed of funda-
mental rights which the State must respect, just as they 
themselves must respect their obligations to the State.95 
This declaration of students' rights would influence Supreme 
Court decisions in the years following Tinker, to the extent of 
becoming something of a presumption. By 1985, no argument 
from either side of the decision in T.L.O. felt it necessary to 
debate the question of whether students deserved constitu-
tional protection.96 
8. The Goss Decision 
Equally influential, however, was the holding in a 1975 
Supreme Court decision, Goss v. Lopez. 97 Goss involved a con-
flict between an Ohio state law providing for free education for 
all children between the ages of six and twenty-one and a school 
administrator's ability to expel students for breaches of school 
rules. 
A group of nine students, (all minorities) from a public high 
school in Columbus, Ohio were suspended for their involvement 
in wide-spread student unrest in the school district during Feb-
ruary and March of 1971. State law required that the students 
be given a hearing on their suspension within ten days, but 
none of the nine students were given such a hearing. When the 
state court ordered that the students be reinstated and that 
93. See id. at 507. 
94. See id. 
95. Id. at 511. 
96. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
97. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
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their records be expunged of any reference to the suspension, 
the State appealed.98 
9. Analysis 
Although the question presented to the Supreme Court was 
one of due process, the Court also made a clear statement as to 
the very real need in public school administration for freedom 
to act quickly in disciplinary actions. That recognized need 
would become instrumental in the T.L.O. decision as the major-
ity gathered support for an argument that a strict search and 
seizure requirement of a warrant supported by affidavits was 
just not practicable in a public school setting.99 Ultimately, the 
Court held that a warrant was not required of school officials 
for a search of a student. 100 
With support from its decision in Goss for the proposition 
that a warrant requirement was "unsuited to the school environ-
ment,"101 all that remained was to address the issue of probable 
cause. On this point the Court turned to another prior decision 
in the Almeida-Sanchez case wherein it had held that the prob-
able cause requirement was not always necessary to a reason-
able search. 102 
The exact language from the Almeida-Sanchez decision was, 
"both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a 
warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search," and, "in cer-
tain limited circumstances neither is required." 103 
As has been stated, New Jersey v. T.£.0. 104 was not only the 
culminating point for two distinct groups of cases, but it repre-
sented the Supreme Court's first encounter with the issue of 
Fourth Amendment protection for students in public schools. In 
its holding, the Court created the latest and perhaps the broad-
est exception to the Katz warrant and probable cause require-
ments-what has come to be known as the "special needs" ex-
ception. 
98. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 568. 
99. See id. at 580. 
100. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. 
101. !d. 
102. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
103. !d. at 277. 
104. 469 U.S. at 325 (1985). 
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E. NEW JERSEY V. T.L. 0. 
In March of 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in 
New Jersey discovered two girls smoking in the lavatory. One 
of the two girls was the defendant, T.L.O., who was only four-
teen at the time and a freshman at the school. Because smoking 
in the lavatory was a violation of school rules, the teacher took 
the girls to the Principal's Office where they met the Assistant 
Vice Principal Choplick. 105 
In response to Mr. Choplick's questions, T.L.O.'s companion 
admitted that she had violated the rule. When asked, however, 
T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory and 
said that she didn't smoke at all. Mr. Choplick asked T.L.O. to 
come into his office where he demanded to see her purse. Open-
ing the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed 
and presented to T.L.O., accusing her oflying to him. 106 
In reaching for the cigarettes, Mr. Choplick had seen, in the 
purse, a packet of rolling papers for cigarettes. From his experi-
ence, possession of rolling papers by high school students meant 
involvement with marijuana. Suspecting that he would find 
more evidence of drug use in the purse, Mr. Choplick looked 
closely in the purse and found a small amount of marijuana, a 
pipe, some empty plastic bags, and an unusually large roll of 
one-dollar bills. Also in the purse was an index card that ap-
peared to be a list of student customers who owed T.L.O. money 
and two letters which implicated T.L.O. in dealing marijuana. 
After Mr. Choplick notified police and T.L.O.'s mother, 
T.L.O. went with her mother to police headquarters and con-
fessed to selling marijuana in the high school. On the basis of 
that confession and the evidence found by Mr. Choplick, delin-
quency charges were filed against T.L.O. In court, T.L.O. con-
tended that her confession and the evidence found by Mr. 
Choplick were tainted by his illegal search of her purse. The 
court denied her motion to suppress the evidence and she was 
held to be a delinquent and put on probation for one year. On 
appeal to State Supreme Court held the search was in violation 
105. See id. at 328. 
106. See id. 
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of constitutional rights under U.S. Supreme Court decisions, 
and the evidence was ruled inadmissible. 107 
10. Student Expectations of Privacy 
The Court first held, on the basis of Elkins 108 and 
Barnette, 109 that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by 
public school officials. Next, the argument turned to the stu-
dent's expectation of privacy. Though never citing directly to 
the Tinker110 decision, the Court nevertheless relied heavily on 
the Tinker reasoning that because students don't give up their 
constitutional rights when they enter the school, they should 
not be reasoned to have waived privacy rights as to the contents 
of their bags, pockets, and purses either. 111 
11. Special Needs of the School Environment 
Having established students' rights and reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy, the Court next faced the task of explaining why 
those two considerations were not enough to find the search 
unreasonable and suppress the evidence. This is that critical 
juncture at which the line of cases showing the evolution of 
exceptions to the Katz warrant and probable cause require-
ments comes to bare. Thus far, the case law presented has been 
for the purpose of showing that students have rights and that 
the administrators are state actors and are bound by the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Having already shown in a plethora of search and seizure 
cases that exceptional circumstances required exceptions to the 
hard and fast requirements of traditional Fourth Amendment 
analysis, the first point of attack for the Supreme Court with 
107. See id. at 329-30. 
108. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960l ("the Federal Constitution, 
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures 
by state officers"). 
109. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("The 
Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the 
State itself and all of its creatures-Board of Education not excepted"). 
110. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) 
("It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate"). 
111. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. 
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regard to the reasonableness of a school search was to show the 
unique disciplinary needs in the public school environment. 
Citing the results of a congressional study on school safety112 
and its own statement from Goss 113 in 1975, the Court argued 
that school safety and discipline required some "easing of the 
restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordi-
narily subject."114 The opinion continued, "[t]he warrant re-
quirement ... is unsuited to the school environment ... [and] 
would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and 
informal disciplinary procedure needed in the schools."115 
12. The Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements 
Next, the majority addressed the probable cause require-
ment. Since some of the Court's earlier holdings on exigency 
exceptions had stated that either a warrant or probable cause 
could be set aside under specific circumstances and still not 
make a search inherently unreasonable, both could be set aside, 
if need be, and other checks on officer's discretion would 
suffice. 116 
The Court's answer was to create a test to fit differing cir-
cumstances, setting aside the requirement for a warrant or 
probable cause. That test asks: 1) whether the action was justi-
fied at its inception, and 2) whether the search as conducted 
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place. 117 As a guide, the 
Court indicated that a search of a student by a school official 
would normally be justified in its inception "when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up 
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the 
law or the rules of the school."118 
112. See id.; U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Violent Schools-Safe 
Schools: The Safe School Study Report to the Congress, 1 NIE (1978) ("[I]n recent 
years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent 
crime in the schools have become major social problems"). 
113. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) ("[e)vents calling for discipline are 
frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action"). 
114. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. 
115. !d. 
116. See id. at 340-41. 
117. See id. 
118. !d. at 341-42. 
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13. In Loco Parentis 
It should also be noted that the Court was troubled by the 
State assertion that school administrators were acting in loco 
parentis, or in the role of parents, and thus should not be forced 
to justify their actions in the T.L. 0. search under Fourth 
Amendment analysis. 119 The Court noted that it had recognized 
that theory of delegation in the past, but insisted that it did not 
intend to remove from school administrators any liability for 
their actions as representatives of the State. 120 Thus, in the 
end, the Court found the possibility of liability based on the 
dual role of school administrators. The laxness of the test cre-
ated in T.L.O. for a reasonable search under the special needs 
exception seemed to account for some appreciation of the theory 
of in loco parentis. No longer would an administrator be re-
quired to obtain a warrant or show probable cause. Instead, 
immediate action in response to a perceived problem with the 
person's charge was justified for many of the same reasons we 
use to excuse the father's search of his son's room. 
The special needs exception was the latest and broadest 
exception permitting a court to engage in a balancing test 
rather than adhere to the Fourth Amendment's textual require-
ments where the government can articulate a special need to do 
so. In this key decision, the Supreme Court not only demon-
strated the evolution of its concept of constitutional require-
ments in a search, but created a type of search that perhaps no 
one could have predicted twenty years earlier. From its former 
insistence that a warrant and probable cause be present, the 
Court had moved to the other extreme, saying that in some 
situations neither a warrant or probable cause was essential to 
a reasonable search. 121 
This result may be framed as a statement of changing 
times. Such an explanation is acceptable to a limited extent. As 
a whole, we get accustomed to change, and we adjust to it. But 
a more complete and satisfying explanation is found in the 
cases the majority cited and the precedents they followed. Thus, 
the structure of this discussion has centered on those pieces. 
119. !d. at 336. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. at 340-41. 
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Thus far, the Court's discussion has been devoted to perhaps 
the most telling factor-the unique circumstances that were 
addressed by the Court. 
T.L.O. was groundbreaking in the obvious particulars al-
ready discussed: the creation of a new exception to traditional 
search and seizure law, and the dismissal ofwarrant and prob-
able cause requirements. But the long-term significance of 
T.L.O. might be measured from more subtle points in the deci-
sion. For instance, the test proposed by the Court for determin-
ing the reasonableness of a search did not specifically require 
individualized suspicion. 122 Nor did it insist on any proof that 
information leading to the search be validated or tested in any 
way. Actions by administration were accepted as valid in T.L. 0. 
if the actions could be shown to be reasonable under the circum-
stances. 
Under the new criteria, a mistaken observation or a faulty 
report could still be reasonable grounds to conduct a search if 
the circumstances were convincing. Without the requirement of 
either probable cause and with only a reference to "reasonable 
scope" to substitute for individualized suspicion, broad and 
random searches could be upheld based on little more than a 
perception of a serious but general problem which might be 
122. See id. at 340-41. The Court stated: 
The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion 
of illicit activity needed to justify a search .... The accommodation of the 
privacy interests of school children with the substantial need of teachers 
and administrators for freedom to maintain order in schools does not 
require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on 
probable cause. 
Nowhere in the T.L.O. decision is there a requirement made of individualized 
suspicion. As the quotes above indicate, there was every inference that lack of 
individualized suspicion, like the lack of probable cause, could be excused on the basis 
of circumstances. In Vernonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995), the Court said of 
their decision in T.L.O., "The school search we approved in T.L.O., while not based 
on probable cause, was based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. As we 
explicitly acknowledged, however, 'the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible 
requirement of such suspicion.'" (emphasis added). 
The preceding italicized quote which Justice Ginsburg attributed to the 
principle of individualized suspicion, was directed to the requirement of probable 
cause, as shown earlier in this footnote. It is difficult to ascertain why the principle 
of individualized suspicion was brought up at all when it was dismissed just as 
quickly however, the fact remains the T.L.O. search may have been based on 
individualized suspicion, but the T.L.O. approved exception to traditional Fourth 
Amendment analysis did not have any such requirement. 
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effectively regulated by general searches. Using this T.L.O. 
test, schools attempted bold inroads upon the Fourth Amend-
ment, some of which failed. 123 
14. The Cales Failure, The Williams Success 
In 1980, Ruth Cales, fifteen, was a student at Howell High 
School. The school operated on staggered sessions. She was 
assigned to the afternoon session on the day of April 30, 1980. 
That afternoon, when she was supposed to be in class, school 
security (another innovation in recent years) observed her in 
the parking lot of the school, attempting to avoid detection by 
hiding behind a parked car. 
When the security guard confronted her and asked for her 
name, she lied about her identity-though the record does not 
indicate how the officer new she was lying. Subsequently, she 
was escorted to the office of Assistant Principal McCarthy. Mr. 
McCarthy presided over the remainder of the search process by 
giving instructions to a Ms. Steinhelper who searched Ruth in a 
separate office. First Ruth was ordered to dump the contents of 
her purse on a desk. This was done in front of Mr. McCarthy. 
Several "readmittance slips" were revealed, which were improp-
erly in her possession. Based on his observation of the slips, Mr. 
McCarthy would later testify that he suspected Ruth's involve-
ment in drug activity. 
Mr. McCarthy then ordered Ruth to turn her pants pockets 
inside-out, which revealed nothing unusual. Then, in another 
office without Mr. McCarthy, Ruth was ordered to remove her 
pants in front of Ms. Steinhelper. When this revealed nothing 
incriminating, Mr. McCarthy ordered Ruth, via Ms. 
Steinhelper, to bend over in such a way that Ms. Steinhelper 
could inspect the contents of her brassiere. Again, nothing un-
usual was found. 
The lawsuit against the Howell school district which fol-
lowed was addressed by the District Court as a matter of an 
unreasonable, and thus, unjustifiable search under the recent 
ruling in T.£.0. 124 The court used the T.L.O. ruling as the stan-
dard by which they determined that the search of Ruth Cales 
123. See Cales v. Howell Public Schools, 635 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 1985). 
124. See id. at 456. 
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had been unreasonable. The court found that the high school 
had no written policy on strip searches of students. It also held 
that because the test was unreasonable in its inception, the 
second prong of the test, the issue of scope, was never consid-
ered. 
The court refused to accept as reasonable the perception by 
Mr. McCarthy that Ruth's "ducking behind a car in the Howell 
High School parking lot" and possession of "readmittance slips" 
constituted circumstances that made any search for drug pos-
session reasonable. It indicated that a search of the contents of 
the purse would likely be justified, on the basis of her lie to the 
security officer as to her identity. A need to prove her identity 
and prove that she was not involved in theft or other illegality 
in the parking lot seemed reason enough. However, as soon as 
the search was deemed unreasonable, liability was imposed, 
and the analysis did not continue to the subject of whether or 
not Ruth should have been made to strip. 125 
On the other end of the spectrum lies the Williams by Wil-
liams v. Ellington decision, in which a strip search of a high 
school student was found permissible by the Sixth Circuit 
Court. 126 In that case, school administrators acted on the basis 
of repeated tips from a fellow student that two girls were doing 
drugs. On January 22, 1988, a final tip was given by the in-
forming student, stating that the two suspected girls were "at it 
again." 127 
Based on the cumulative information from this student as 
well as some unsolicited finger pointing by the suspected stu-
dents, the teacher contacted and fully updated a vice principal. 
A search of the girls' lockers and purses revealed a small vial 
containing an over-the-counter substance nicknamed "rush." 
She was then taken into an office where she was instructed by 
a female faculty member to empty her pockets, then remove her 
shirt and then drop her pants. The further search revealed 
nothing suspicious. 
In reviewing the reasonableness and scope of that search, 
the Sixth Circuit Court found that there was enough circum-
stantial evidence to support a search of both girls. Furthermore, 
125. See id. at 457-58. 
126. 936 F.2d 881 (6'h Cir. 1991). 
127. See id. at 883. 
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the court held that the scope of the search-a strip search-was 
reasonable because the vial that had been found was so small it 
could have been hidden in underclothing. It is significant that 
prior to the Sixth Circuit's addressing of the circumstances in 
Williams, it was privy to the Seventh Circuit's holding regard-
ing drug testing in Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County 
School Corporation, 128 but the court seemed to rely completely 
on the T.L. 0. decision. 
F. RANDOM, SUSPICION-LESS DRUG TESTING 
In light of the increased use of the T.L. 0. reasonableness 
test, an accelerated focus from lockers to pockets to test tubes 
became a reality. In the years that followed, the idea of drug 
testing by urinalysis came to the forefront of the Fourth 
Amendment debate. The Supreme Court found random, 
suspicion-less drug testing was justified in several cases includ-
ing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association in 1989. 129 
Skinner, a railroad worker's case, presented the Court with 
a significant opportunity to apply the T.L.O. analysis to a non-
school setting that required the application of the special needs 
exception. The policy in question required train operators and 
personnel in certain levels of control to undergo urinalysis and 
possibly blood testing in the event of any reported mishap. 
The Court discussed at length the intrusive nature of the 
test in comparison with the employees' diminished expectation 
of privacy from working in a highly regulated field. It consid-
ered the lack of individualized suspicion in comparison with the 
prevailing public need for safety in passenger train operation. 130 
In the end, the factors of public need and a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy led the Court to uphold the policy, despite the 
lack of a warrant, probable cause, individualized suspicion, or 
even the theory of in loco parentis. 131 
Even prior to the final Skinner holding, court decisions 
nation-wide began to point toward Supreme Court approval of 
intrusive drug testing. It is no surprise that approval was given 
128. 864 F.2d 1309 (7'h Cir. 1988). 
129. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
130. See id. at 620. 
131. See id. 
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in Skinner and other cases. 132 Meanwhile, courts across the 
country were addressing the issue of drug testing in public 
schools. One such issue came to a head in the Seventh Circuit 
decision regarding the Tippecanoe County School Corporation 
in Indiana.133 
15. The Schaill Decision 
The Tippecanoe County School Corporation (TSC) operates 
two high schools in Indiana. In the spring of 1986, the baseball 
coach, at McCutcheon High School, received information lead-
ing him to suspect that some of his baseball team might be 
involved in drug use. The coach ordered urinalysis for sixteen 
players. No objections of any consequence were noted. From the 
samples taken, five of the sixteen players were found to be us-
ing marijuana. Based on those findings and other suspicion 
that drug abuse was a growing problem in the athletic program 
generally, the TSC Board of Trustees decided to institute a 
random urine testing program for interscholastic athletes and 
cheerleaders within the TSC school system. 
Because the Vernonia program instituted in 1995 so closely 
mirrors the TSC drug testing program, there are significant 
details that deserve mentioning. However, the details of its 
implementation are reserved for discussion under the Vernonia 
decision. In the spring of 1987, Darcy Schaill and Shelley John-
son were fifteen-year-old sophomores at Harrison High School, 
which TSC also operated. Shelley had been a member of the 
Varsity Swim Team as a freshman. Both students attended an 
informational meeting prior to the 1987 school year where they 
learned of the drug testing program and both decided that they 
would not participate in school athletics if a signed consent 
form for random drug testing was required for participation. As 
soon as the school began the testing program, the students filed 
their claim. 
132. See National Treasury Employee Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 
(1989). 
133. See Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (71h Cir. 1988). 
lUO n.r.u . .c..uuvJ-\llVl~ J-\l~v ~vv t~vunl'j.n..l..J 
16. Analysis 
The District Court denied the students' claims for declara-
tory and injunctive relief. They appealed to the Seventh Circuit 
Court. The court began its analysis by quickly deciding that 
urine testing involves a search under the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the Fourth Amendment in United States v. 
Jacobsen, a decision which followed the Katz definition of 
"search" very closely. 134 The Court held, without counter discus-
sion, that the act of urination is one in which society recognizes 
a reasonable expectation ofprivacy. 
Having determined that the act of urination was a private 
act, and that urine testing was a search, the court moved imme-
diately to the effect of a signed waiver upon the constitutional-
ity of the search. To determine this point, the court addressed 
what level of suspicion was required in this circumstance. 
While a warrant and probable cause discussion would normally 
have followed, because of the Supreme Court's decision in 
T.L.O., the Seventh Circuit felt no need to debate those require-
ments, and found instead that the requirements did not apply 
in the public school setting. This effectively dissolved the appel-
lants' broadest attack against the school board. 
Finding no requirement of suspicion meant that the remain-
ing inquiry need only focus on the reasonableness of the test, as 
the T.L. 0. decision had suggested. 135 The T.L. 0. requirement 
was that the search be reasonable in its inception and in its 
scope. Thus the Seventh Circuit addressed whether there was 
good reason to enact a urine testing program in the school dis-
trict, and whether it was reasonable in its policy of randomly 
testing athletes and cheerleaders. 
Reasonableness in this court's analysis fell into a two-part 
test: 1) whether the individual being tested has a diminished 
expectation of privacy because of their involvement in the ath-
letic or cheerleading program, and 2) whether the government 
interest in the testing was significant enough to outweigh the 
intrusion. This analysis was drawn directly from the traditional 
balancing test created in light of Katz which weighs intrusion 
134. 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("[A] search occurs when an expectation of privacy 
that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed"). 
135. See supra, note 120. 
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against government interest. But this test was impacted se-
verely by the school setting. 
Because the process of obtaining urine samples was closely 
guarded and the faculty member supervising the process was 
positioned either behind the student or outside the bathroom 
stall door, the immediate personal intrusion was considered to 
be mitigated. Furthermore, because the test was reserved to 
specific programs that carry a diminished sense or expectation 
of privacy in their normal operations, the intrusion was miti-
gated even more. The Court reasoned that the athletes, and 
presumably the cheerleaders, were accustomed to being in front 
of others in locker rooms in a state of partial undress. There-
fore, the intrusion was not considered in the same light as it 
would have been in the case of a non-athlete. 
Another factor in the diminished sense of privacy was the 
high regulation of the activity by coaches and trainers. The fact 
that parbcipation in the programs involved many rules of train-
ing and conduct seemed to weigh significantly on the court. 
Also, the general societal recognition that drug abuse was a 
growing problem in the area of professional and collegiate ath-
letics and in the Olympic competition, convinced the court that 
no student participating in the athletic program could have a 
valid expectation of privacy. 
In weighing the governmental interest, the Court's chief 
considerations were the earlier findings by the baseball coach 
at an adjoining school and the general concern nation-wide of a 
growing drug problem. Additionally, the court recognized the 
elevated stature of athletes and cheerleaders in the eyes of the 
high school student body. In identifying a potentially serious 
problem, the court held that the search was permissible both in 
its inception and in its scope. It seemed to console itself in the 
holding by noting that the information gathered in the testing 
was only effective as to removing a student from the athletic 
programs, not from school itself and not it was connected to 
criminal prosecution. 
In light of the Schaill holding, which was in direct conflict 
with other decisions from other parts of the country relating to 
very similar circumstances and claims, 136 it was inevitable that 
136. See Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. lndep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759 
(S.D. Texas 1989) (individualized suspicion was held to still be a requirement in 
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the Supreme Court would address the issue of search and sei-
zure in public schools again, in the context of drug testing. And 
so it did in the 1995 Vernonia School District u. Acton case. 137 
G. THE VERNONIA DECISION 
In the early 1990s, in an isolated logging community in the 
mountains of Oregon, the Vernonia School District operated one 
high school and three grade schools. For many years, the Dis-
trict had been quiet and isolated-free from "big city" noise, 
pollution and vice. But between 1980 and 1990, administrators 
saw a marked increase in behavioral problems in the high 
school. Some faculty members reported hearing drug-related 
talk, and an increasing number of disciplinary incidents were 
occurring. The faculty reported that the "[s]tudents became 
increasingly rude during class; outbursts of profane language 
became common." 138 A football and wrestling coach attributed a 
sternum injury and some poor execution on the football field to 
drug use. 
Based on faculty observations, special programs were begun 
wherein classes were offered and speakers were hired to talk 
about drug use and attempt to deter the students from involve-
ment. A drug-sniffing dog was also brought onto campus. 139 
None of the administration's efforts worked. The court found 
that the student body, "particularly those involved in 
interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion." 140 The 
increased disciplinary problems in conjunction with language 
and dress which the teachers and administration observed as 
glamorizing a drug culture finally forced the District to assume 
that the "rebellion" was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse 
and students' misconceptions about drug culture. 141 
In 1988, the District officials began considering a drug-test-
ing program. They held an open meeting for parental opinions 
to discuss the proposed Drug Testing Policy. The parents at-
tending the meeting gave their unanimous approval, and the 
urinalysis). 
137. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
138. Id. at 649. 
139. See id. 
140. ld. 
141. Id. 
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School Board approved the policy for implementation in the 
next fall, 1989. The express purpose of the policy was "to pre-
vent student athletes from using drugs, to protect their health 
and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance pro-
grams."142 
17. The Testing Policy 
The policy implemented by the District was, in almost every 
significant aspect, identical to the Tippecanoe County School 
Corporation policy in the Schaill decision, announced earlier 
that year. It is highly probable that the Vernonia District bor-
rowed the policy directly from that decision because of its suc-
cess on appeal in the Seventh Circuit Court. The only difference 
worth noting between the two policies is the penalty portion. 
The Vernonia policy gave the student athlete who tested posi-
tive the option of a six-week rehabilitative program and con-
stant monitoring, or suspension for the remainder of the ath-
letic season and the next season of any sport. A second failure 
would automatically result in suspension. This would equate to 
a maximum suspension from athletic participation of approxi-
mately six months unless the student failed another test. The 
third failure resulted in suspension for the remainder of the 
current athletic season and the next two seasons (a maximum 
additional penalty of approximately nine months). 
The Schaill program allowed for four failures and graduated 
the suspension somewhat. Instead of losing the remainder of 
the season on the first failure and the next two seasons on the 
second failure, the Schaill test penalized the student by sus-
pending him or her from one-third of the games on the first 
offense, and one-half of the games on the second offense. The 
third failure would mean no athletic participation for an aca-
demic year. The fourth offense resulted in a suspension for the 
remainder of the student's high school years. 
Two years after the implementation of the policy, James 
Acton, then in seventh grade, signed up to play football in one 
of the District's grade schools. But because he and his parents 
had refused to sign the requisite consent forms, he was denied 
participation. The Actons filed suit against the District, seeking 
142. Id. at 650. 
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injunctive relief from the policy which they claimed violated the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution 
and two provisions of the Oregon State constitution. 
18. Analysis 
Much like the circumstances and the testing program com-
mon to both the Schaill case and Vernonia, the formation of the 
Supreme Court's decision closely mirrored the Seventh Circuit 
reasoning as well. It proceeded almost identically: 1) finding 
that urine testing is a search which animates a Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, 2) applying the T.L.O. test for reasonableness in 
inception and scope to determine the legality of the search, 3) 
reiterating that a warrant and probable cause were not re-
quired after T.L.O., 4) finding that athletes share only a dimin-
ished sense of privacy, 5) finding that the test is conducted in 
strict control, and 6) finding that the governmental interest is 
substantial in light of the dangerous possibilities. 143 
Perhaps most contrasted of all the arguments between 
Schaill and Vernonia is the fact that the Supreme Court, after 
finding that the T.L.O. decision eliminated the need for a war-
rant or probable cause in public school actions, went to compar-
atively great lengths to bolster that decision with the doctrine 
of in loco parentis. The court restructured its earlier T.L.O. 
rejection of the idea that school administrators acted under 
parental authority by stating: 
While denying that the State's power over schoolchildren is 
formally no more than the delegated power of their parents, 
T.L.O. did not deny, but indeed emphasized, that the nature of 
that power is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of 
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free 
adults. 144 
The Court went on to explain that although children do not 
shed their rights at the school gates, the rights they carry are 
not the same as those outside the school setting. 145 The case 
143. For a summary of the Supreme Court's holding and analysis in Vernonia, 
see also Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d 571-72 (7u-. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 1998 
WL334388. 
144. 515 U.S. 646 at 655. 
145. See id. at 656. 
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cited as justification for that finding was Goss, where due pro-
cess for a student challenging disciplinary suspension required 
only that the teacher "informally discuss the alleged misconduct 
with the student minutes after it has occurred."146 
In T.L.O. the Court argued that school officials were subject 
to the "commands of the First Amendment,"147 and then entered 
a discussion on the source of public school authority. The argu-
ment followed that because teachers had already been found to 
be state actors for purposes of freedom of expression and due 
process, they must be state actors for the purposes of privacy 
rights. 
The Court stated that the idea of parental delegation, as a 
source of school authority, was "not entirely 'consistent with 
compulsory education laws,' "148 and that school officials do not 
exercise authority "voluntarily conferred on them by individual 
parents," but in conducting disciplinary and search procedures, 
the authorities "act as representatives of the State, not merely 
as surrogates for the parents."149 
In Vernonia, the Court was faced with the necessity of justi-
fying a much greater intrusion upon individual privacy rights 
than was presented in T.L. 0. In light of that burden, it is not 
surprising that the majority showed a renewed willingness to 
embrace the doctrine of in loco parentis. The tenuous but cru-
cial connection between a child's reduced expectation of privacy 
in the home and the student's reduced expectations of privacy 
in school was important in the Court's justification of an exten-
sion of the special needs exception introduced in T.L. 0. 
The most significant of the comparative arguments, from 
T.L.O. to Vernonia (and everything in between)/50 is the clear 
indication that the courts are struggling to empower school 
officials to effectively address rising threats to children. But the 
146. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975). 
147. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (citing Tinker). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 325. 
150. Vernonia is susceptible to several different interpretations: (1) that "special 
needs" justifying drug testing always exist in the public school context, and thus 
school authorities may require drug testing for any reason including controlling access 
to core classes; (2) that it is necessary to show a particularized governmental need 
to impose drug testing on a particular student population; (3) that drug testing is 
permitted in special scholastic environments in which the need is well identified and 
the privacy expectations are diminished. Todd., 139 F.3d at 572. 
114 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1999 
courts must find a means of doing so on the basis of available 
case law. Thus, the Supreme Court, over ten years and a moun-
tain of frightening statistics, applied every successful argument 
from T.L.O., added several points from lower court decisions, 
and then reversed its position on another issue in order to ex-
pand search and seizure in schools to include random, 
suspicionless drug testing. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
From a constitutional point of view, the path created be-
tween T.L.O., Williams, Schaill, and Vernonia was particularly 
intrusive upon individual privacy rights. Yet, the accelerated 
incidence of drugs, weapons and even explosives entering public 
schools in the 1990s makes it highly probable that the evolution 
of search and seizure law will accelerate as well. 151 It is predict-
able, for example, that the criteria of a diminished sense of 
privacy will be tested beyond athletics and cheerleading. 
A. THE FUTURE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN PUBLIC SCHOOL 
The next steps in search and seizure law for public schools 
will be toward broader regulation with less requirements of 
individualized or even focused suspicion.152 This is witnessed by 
the present reality of metal detectors at school entrances and 
school-wide book bag checks in many inner-city public 
schools.153 These programs are justified by the need to raise 
student protections, but ironically, serve to lower students' 
expectations of privacy as well as their constitutional 
protections of that interest. Thus, students who are not in-
volved in athletics or cheerleading might be seen as having a 
lesser expectation of privacy. The presence and implementation 
of such precautions emphasize the unique safety and disciplin-
ary concerns in public schools, while at the same time, bolster 
151. See id. at 571-72 (7'h Cir. 1998), cert. denied 1998 WL334388 (holding that 
Vernonia could not be interpreted as meaning all children are subject to testing all 
the time). 
152. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (holding that drug testing of 
electoral candidates for public office was not justified because the targeted group was 
not found to have a high degree of drug use or to perform safety-related tasks 
justifying such scrutiny). 
153. See In the Interest of S.S., W.L. 39, 2112 (Penn. 1996). 
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the Vernonia argument that students cannot be given the same 
rights that adults have. 
19. Plausible Scenarios 
These searches involve no individualized suspicion, and are 
deemed reasonable in inception and scope because of the in-
creased rate of violence and drug use in schools. As the drug 
problem is recognized as more inclusive than merely an athletic 
dilemma, it is foreseeable that school-wide drug testing could 
be introduced, coinciding with school-wide bag searches and 
metal detectors. These drug tests would be found reasonable 
because of both the perceived threat of drugs and the dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in every student who has under-
gone the other searches in the past. 
This is but one scenario of many that are plausible. Others 
would include the testing of particular student clubs upon evi-
dence that there is a drug problem or the random testing or 
general searching of participants at school dances or athletic 
events. It is also conceivable that school officials, given ever 
increasing latitude in the exercise of search and seizure, may 
abuse the authority for their own perverse or otherwise manip-
ulative purposes. In any of these scenarios, the base has al-
ready been laid by T.L.O. and its progeny. After the liberal 
application of the T.L.O. reasonableness test in Vernonia, few 
courts will question a school official's increased regulation as 
long as there exists some statistical or testimonial evidence of 
an increased problem with discipline, drugs or violence. Unfor-
tunately, the increased power of school officials may also mean 
a decreased expectation of privacy on the part of students, and 
a diminished sense of outrage at what would have been outright 
abuses of constitutional rights a few years ago. 
Clearly, proving a governmental need has proven the easiest 
hurdle in almost all of the preceding analyses. In T.L. 0., on the 
basis of one noted study presented to Congress, it was found 
reasonable to permit immediate and more aggressive supervi-
sion and discipline in the school. In Vernonia, without a single 
school-specific test that showed that the athletes were involved 
in drug abuse to a higher degree than other students, it was 
found that because of increased discipline problems school-
wide, and by virtue of their roles as leaders in the school, their 
urine could be taken and tested at random. In all of the signifi-
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cant cases, the government need was found to outweigh the 
level of intrusion upon the individual. 
Here, another factor must be considered in the discussion of 
justified searches; that of less-intrusive testing. It is likely that 
as testing procedures advance to the analysis of fingernails and 
hair rather than urine or blood, the intrusiveness of the test 
will be considered reduced. At that point it is not likely to mat-
ter whether the student has participated in locker room set-
tings of partial undress. The fact that he or she attends public 
school, with its metal detectors zero-tolerance policies, and 
armed policemen will lead to the assumption that there is no 
longer a reasonable expectation of privacy in a student's hair or 
finger nails and that testing those items is so easily and accu-
rately done, that it is justifiable in scope. While this advance 
and acceptance would eliminate some of the physical intrusion 
of urine sampling, the information contained in hair and finger-
nails must still be protected, unless at some point students are 
perceived as having no privacy rights at all. 
B. WHAT TO EXPECT FROM PUBLIC SCHOOL AND AT WHAT COST 
Parents who contemplate enrolling their child in public 
schools are now forced to consider more factors than parents 
considered ten, five or even two years ago. They must weigh the 
increased risks of the public school environment with the in-
creased cost of avoiding them, by using a private school or home 
schooling. Those costs cannot be measured in dollars alone. No 
parent withdraws their child from public school without consid-
ering the social, intellectual, creative, and athletic losses which 
could follow. 
On another level, instead of considering the quality of fac-
ulty, parents can be expected to review the known or publicized 
incidents demonstrating a pattern of conduct of school officials 
in regard to discipline and search and seizure. Because the 
majority of what would be made public through various media 
is apt to be exceptional and thus sensational, the perspective of 
a concerned parent may be far from accurate. However, the fact 
that the public might be misinformed is not sufficient, at any 
level of advocacy, to sooth the protective passion of individual 
parents. Few parents would choose a school based upon the 
relative chances of their child being caught and disciplined for 
drug or weapon possession. But most parents, knowing their 
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child, and desiring to protect the child from embarrassment or 
humiliation, would reasonably wonder if such policies might 
harm their child, especially if mis-applied to collusive or de-
structive purposes. 
It might be said that public education, tied as it is to funds 
from the citizens' purse and weighted with such a public char-
ter, is of all creatures in our society the most reluctant in prog-
ress, the most clumsy in change and yet a most accurate mea-
sure of our nation's values and priorities. Because justification 
for expanding search and seizure in public schools is found in 
the fundamental yet overwhelming considerations of the moral 
and physical safety of our children, it is not likely that the 
courts will alter the course of that law until society alters the 
course of education. And yet, it is difficult to imagine that 
change. 
The environment within a public school, for the same rea-
sons, is a direct reflection of social priorities and problems. The 
history of search and seizure in public schools illustrates the 
effort in public education to balance a fundamental charter to 
educate against ever-pressing threats to physical and moral 
well being. The school, with finite resources, cannot take from 
one effort without compromising the other. And a compromise 
on either hand invites a tragedy. 
Thus, while drug abuse, social diseases, and violence be-
come the preoccupation of communities, the school's priorities 
flow increasingly toward protection, and less toward education. 
As parents sending children off each morning, it is doubtful 
that we would have the school swap those priorities. After all, 
with few exceptions, we are more moved by the immediacy of 
physical dangers to our children than intellectual threats. 
Having admitted as much, it behooves us to ask ourselves 
what we expect of public education, and at what price? This 
analysis was undertaken in pursuit of perspective on a single 
issue oflaw in public education; search and seizure. The factors 
that a parent must weigh in deciding whether or not to enroll or 
leave their child in public school vary for each parent and each 
child and are much more broad than this single issue. In that 
context, search and seizure law, with its court-imposed balanc-
ing tests, merely supplies a measure of public priorities. It 
marks the personal intrusions we will tolerate in the interest of 
security. It measures our common fears as accurately as it mea-
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sures personal liberties. In the school setting it may not tell all 
we need to know about the status or course of public education, 
but perhaps it tells enough. 
